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The estate tax has many advocates and opponents. We present
a review of the primary arguments and empirical evidence
promulgated in support of continuation and for repeal. Overall,
we find that there are plausible theories and strong, but not
definitive, empirical evidence on both sides of the issue. Further
research is needed that more clearly isolates differences between
the income-tax and estate-tax (that is, the after-tax cost or
“price” of a donation or bequest) effects, the independent-income
and wealth effects (how having higher income or wealth has an
effect on giving during life and at death), and married and single
estate tax filers. These differences can be best isolated using
longitudinal data. Data and analyses for both the short run and
long run are necessary before society can reasonably predict the
impact the repeal of the estate tax will have on both giving
during life and charitable bequests.
WHY do we have an estate tax? Does the estate tax matter?Will its gradual repeal affect the economy and the non-profit sector? According to Giving USA 2001 (AAFRC
Trust, forthcoming), bequests to philanthropy totaled an estimated
$16 billion in 2000. What will happen to such gifts as the estate tax
is repealed? Will giving increase, decrease, or remain stable? There
is widespread disagreement; conflicting theories abound, and some
evidence exists to support most of them. Repeal also may have many
unintended consequences not yet understood, such as further con-
centration of wealth and political power or the possible impact on
the underlying economic growth rate and the concomitant effects of
growth on income at all levels.
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In the face of a sweeping national policy change, policymakers,
the public, and the nonprofit sector need to better understand the
pros and cons of the estate tax, the potential impact that repeal will
have on giving, and the need for additional study. In the rush to
action, these issues have not received the examination and thorough
debate they merit.
The estate tax and the ability to leave an inheritance are impor-
tant components of the American political and economic landscape,
and they are likely to become even more important in the future. It
is estimated that there are more than five million millionaires and
350,000 decamillionaires in the United States (Philanthropic Initia-
tive, June 2000a). Forecasts by John Havens and Paul Schervish
(1999) suggest that these numbers will grow dramatically in the
next generation. Their conservative estimate is that $41 trillion in
wealth will be transferred from one generation to another between
1998 and 2052, and that at least $6 trillion of it will go to charity.
A less conservative growth estimate, but one that is still within the
range of reasonable estimates of future economic growth, is that
these numbers will almost double. Furthermore, William Gale and
John Karl Scholz report that transfers during life (gifts) account for
at least 20 percent of the wealth of recipients, on average. If
bequests are included, transfers of wealth from one generation to the
next constitute at least 51 percent, and possibly as much as 70 per-
cent, of net worth. Among those who either give or receive wealth
transfers, both groups are more likely to have “obtained at least half
of their wealth from gifts and inheritances” (Gale and Scholz, 1994,
p. 149).
Currently (given that the new legislation starts with deaths in
2002, this article refers to the prerepeal law as the current law), the
head of a household can pass an unlimited amount of assets to a
spouse and $675,000 in property and other assets to heirs free from
taxation under the federal estate tax law. This exemption is sched-
uled to increase to $1 million by 2006 (see Joulfaian, 1998, for use-
ful summaries of the historical and upcoming changes in the estate
tax, as well as behavioral effects). Estate tax rates are relatively pro-
gressive in that they increase rapidly as the value of the estate
grows, from 37 percent to a maximum of 55 percent (on taxable
estates of $3 million or more). According to the National Associa-
tion of Financial and Estate Planning (1999), “more advanced
planning can eliminate or painlessly handle another two or three
million dollars in estate values.” That is, households that plan in
advance can eliminate any estate taxes on $3–4 million of net
worth. In 1998, almost one hundred thousand estate tax returns
were filed, and 17 percent claimed a charitable deduction. Charita-
ble deductions as a percentage of total estate value averaged
only 6 percent, but this percentage is reduced considerably by the
large number of estates that did not leave any charitable gifts
(Billitteri, 2000).
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Recent Legislative Changes
At the time this article was initially submitted, the repeal of the estate
tax was one part of the overall tax package promulgated by President-
elect Bush to stimulate the economy and achieve other policy objec-
tives. On May 26, 2001, Congress passed the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. As part of the EGTRRA 2001,
the estate tax will be gradually reduced (beginning with deaths in
2002) until it is repealed completely in 2010. The exemption will
increase to $1 million in 2002 and then continue to jump up sub-
stantially every two or three years (to $1.5 million in 2004, $2 mil-
lion in 2006, and $3.5 million in 2009). In a similar fashion, the
top tax rate will drop to 50 percent in 2002 and fall incrementally to
45 percent in 2009 before its complete repeal in 2010, but the gift tax
is retained at the maximum income tax rate.
One important aspect of the EGTRRA that has not received
much attention is the sunset provision in 2011. This means that if
nothing is done in the interim to change this provision, we return
to the status quo ante. Hence, there would be no estate tax repeal
from 2011 and beyond. This type of planned uncertainty is the
worst of all worlds from a horizontal equity perspective (are like
people treated the same way?) and from a planning perspective for
households.
Consider three people with similarly large wealth profiles: one
dies in 2009 and the estate pays a top tax rate of 45 percent with an
exemption of $3.5 million; another dies in 2010 and that estate pays
no estate tax; the third person dies in 2011 and this estate pays a top
tax rate of 55 percent with a $675,000 exemption.
The new law does not eradicate the tax implications for heirs and
decedents, especially capital gains taxes. Unlike the prior tax regime,
which allowed a step up in tax basis at death (an asset’s value at the
time of inheritance, rather than the original cost or basis of the dece-
dent, was used to calculate future capital gains when the heir sold the
inherited assets), under the new law those inheriting assets also inherit
the original valuation of the asset. Therefore, any inherited assets accu-
mulate capital gains tax liability from the time the decedent purchased
the asset until the beneficiary of the estate sells the asset. The total cap-
ital gains are subject to a maximum tax rate of 20 percent plus state
taxes where relevant (for a useful summary of the new law versus the
prior one, see Greater Milwaukee Foundation, 2001).
In addition, heirs may be affected by a decline in parental giving
during life for two reasons. First, the gift tax is retained at the maxi-
mum income tax rate. Second, as Kathleen McGarry (2001) points
out, giving during life may decline once bequests are no longer taxed,
because there would be no tax incentive to make an early bequest.
There remain other reasons for parents to support their heirs finan-
cially while the parents are still alive, but the tax motivations for
doing so have changed dramatically.
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Democrats in Congress were unsuccessful in their effort to mod-
ify rather than repeal the estate tax. The Democrats proposed several
alternatives, including raising the estate tax exemption to $5 million,
which would leave only the wealthiest 3,283 estates owing any estate
tax (as opposed to approximately 50,000 in 1999; Weisman, 2001).
Ironically, the repeal passed despite the vocal opposition of more than
a thousand wealthy people, including Ted Turner and Bill Gates’s
father. These individuals all signed a petition opposing the repeal of
the estate tax as being “an unfair windfall to a tiny number of very
wealthy people, forcing others less fortunate to make up the differ-
ence” (Wall Street Journal, 2001, p. 1).
Arguments for Repeal
According to Howard Zaritsky (1980), the earliest known estate tax
dates back to 700 B.C. in Egypt (10 percent of the transfers of prop-
erty at death). In the United States, wealth taxes have existed almost
as long as our country itself, dating back to 1789. The modern estate
tax, created to help finance World War I, generated about 1 percent
of total federal revenues during the past two decades (Gale and
Slemrod, 2000). Although the current estate tax and its predecessors
were created to help finance different wars, President Franklin
Roosevelt argued in favor of continuing the estate tax explicitly as an
effort to redistribute the increasing concentration of wealth.
Scholars have argued, however, that such an effort to redistrib-
ute is not necessary, as there has been tremendous mobility of income
and wealth in the United States. In a syndicated column, Bruce
Bartlett (2000) cites several studies showing movement up and down
the income scale. For example, the University of Michigan found
that in the period from 1971 to 1978, almost half of the top 20 per-
cent of income earners dropped 20 percent or more in income.
Conversely, there is a great deal of upward mobility, with many mov-
ing up at least 20 percent, including almost half of those who were
in the bottom 20 percent of earned income. Similarly, the Treasury
Department found that between 1979 and 1988, 86 percent of those
in the bottom income bracket moved into a higher bracket, and
35 percent of those in the top range dropped 20 percent or more.
Additional studies by the Census Bureau and the Urban Institute, as
well as by the Federal Reserve Board, found similar results. These
data suggest that the U.S. economy is open and dynamic enough that
we may not need the estate tax to ameliorate the impact of the ten-
dency toward concentration of income.
Another argument cited against the tax is that it collects rela-
tively few dollars and requires disproportionate compliance costs.
Henry Aaron and Alicia Munnell (1992) suggest that the total
compliance and administration costs equal or exceed the revenues
generated by the tax. Douglas Bernheim (1987) estimates that after
taking into account the indirect effects through the impact on the
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personal income tax, the “true estate tax revenues may well have
been negative” (p. 135). That is, families will use available legal (and
sometimes illegal) opportunities to minimize income and estate
taxes. Relatively high income taxes may encourage postponing the
tax and shifting the burden to the estate tax. This suggests that total
social well-being would be better served without such a tax. Other
scholars, such as Charles Davenport, argue that the compliance costs
are actually only 7 percent of the revenues collected at most, and that
the 7 percent includes some estate planning that would transpire
even without an estate tax (Kessler, 2000). Furthermore, several stud-
ies have demonstrated that the increases in philanthropic giving
resulting from the estate tax deduction are greater than the revenues
forgone (Boskin, 1976; Joulfaian, 1999).
Among the most common rationales given for repeal are that the
tax is or causes a “punishment for success,” or “double taxation,” or
sale of some family farms and businesses to pay taxes. Most estate
tax revenue does indeed come from the largest estates; in 1998, more
than half of the total revenue came from estates valued at more than
$5 million. It is also the case that many assets subject to estate tax
are previously taxed at some point along the way, and that the income
used to purchase those assets originally was subject to income tax in
the first place. However, it must be said that some of the assets that
are subject to the estate tax have not been taxed prior to probate and
that the estate tax can serve as an effective backstop to gaps in
income tax ( Joulfaian, 1998).
Of course, whether or not the estate tax is a punishment for suc-
cess or a tax on being lucky depends on who one believes is paying
the estate tax. If the wealth creator is the one paying the tax, then the
estate tax might be construed as a punishment for success. However,
practically the estate tax is paid by the heirs. This suggests that the
tax is on the good luck of having “picked” financially successful par-
ents. If we are concerned with equal opportunity, such a tax on luck
may be a good idea.
The argument that resonates most with legislators, the media,
and the American people, however, is the potential loss of small fam-
ily farms and businesses. This aspect of the debate underscores the
need for closer examination of the issues. To start with, very few of
these are subject to the estate tax at all; cases where family farms or
family businesses are the biggest part of the estate make up only
about 3 percent of all estates taxed. Even those family farms and busi-
nesses that are subject to the tax have several options to help them,
including protecting part of the assets through estate planning, a
scheduled increase in the exemption, other special exemptions, and
spreading payment of the estate tax over fourteen years.
Beyond that, changing the law to provide an even larger exemp-
tion or permitting an even longer payment period could address any
remaining concerns affecting this group of taxpayers. Even one of the
leading opponents of the estate tax, the American Farm Bureau
RE P E A L O F T H E ES TAT E TA X A N D IT S IM PA C T O N PH I L A N T H R O P Y 197
Among the most
common
rationales given
for repeal are
that the tax is or
causes a
“punishment for
success,” or
“double
taxation,” or sale
of some family
farms and
businesses
Federation, could not find a single case of a farm lost because of
estate taxes ( Johnston, 2001). Contrary to the rhetoric, when fam-
ily farms and businesses are sold by heirs, it is because the heirs do
not want to continue the family farm or business—not because the
estate tax is so punitive that they are forced to make the choice
between paying the tax and keeping the farm or business.
Another reason offered for abolishing the estate tax is the theory
that any tax on wealth discourages savings. Joseph Stiglitz’s research
(1978) raises the theoretical possibility that the estate tax discour-
ages savings in the economy. Why save a dollar if the government
takes half of it? This argument has important implications for the
overall economy. If the estate tax were to diminish savings, holding
everything else constant, the result would be lower capital formation,
which in turn yields slower productivity growth. Productivity growth
and technological change are the main determinants of growth in real
(inflation-adjusted) income; therefore, savings are important to the
economy and to our standard of living. This is important because
Stiglitz points out the theoretical potential paradox that a tax that is
designed to redistribute wealth may in economic terms actually harm
low-wealth holders (and the nonwealthy) by depressing real wages.
James Poterba (1997) estimates that the estate tax does raise the
effective tax rate on capital (savings) and that the impact depends on
the age of the wealth holder. For the relatively young (heads of
household aged fifty to fifty-nine), the estate tax adds only 0.3 per-
centage points to the average tax rate on capital, but for “older” heads
of households (between seventy and seventy-nine), the estate tax
adds an additional 3 percentage points to the tax burden on capital
or savings.
However, some evidence suggests that estate taxes may have a
relatively small detrimental effect on savings, according to a policy
brief by William G. Gale and Joel Slemrod for the Brookings Institu-
tion (2000). They point out that most of the empirical research
suggests that savings by households is not very sensitive to changes
in income tax rate, and that, arguably, households would be even
less sensitive to changes in an estate tax. The reasons are that the
estate tax is more distant in time than are income taxes, and that
the estate tax, unlike the income tax, is not paid by the wealth cre-
ator (the saver).
Some observers even argue that savings can be a reason to con-
tinue the tax. That is, the estate tax can be an incentive to create
more wealth and more savings for wealth holders who want to leave
a certain amount to their children after taxes. For example, if parents
want to leave $1 million to each child, then, after the first child, they
would have to save $2.2 million in preestate tax dollars to bequeath
$1 million in after-estate-tax dollars. Note that with the current
exemption, the first child’s million is nearly tax-free and will become
completely tax-free by 2006. Absent the estate tax, the parents sim-
ply save the $1 million per child they wish to leave behind, which
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would decrease total savings in the economy by approximately
$1.2 million per child, after the first child.
Philanthropy Supply-Side Argument for Repeal
Within the nonprofit sector, one reason given for estate tax repeal is
what Havens and Schervish refer to as the “supply-side,” or wealth,
effect (1999). They suggest that without the estate tax, the rich and
their heirs would have more after-tax and after-bequest-to-heirs
wealth to give to charities. This theory is supported by their empir-
ical research, which found that people with large final estates (those
with no surviving spouse) gave away more of their wealth than did
people with small final estates. For example, in 1997 smaller estates
($1–9.99 million) bequeathed to charities an average of 5.6 percent,
whereas larger final estates ($20 million or more) gave away an aver-
age of 49 percent to charity but only 21 percent to heirs (Schervish
and Havens, forthcoming). Additional support for this idea comes
from research by Gerald Auten and David Joulfaian (1996), showing
that when children are better off financially parents are more likely
to make charitable contributions. These points suggest that ending
the estate tax could ultimately increase charitable giving.
By contrast, the supply-side theory may be at least partially
refuted by a study by Robert Avery and Michael Rendall (1990),
which predicts that for every $1,000 of entrepreneurial wealth, the
entrepreneur gives away $4.56, but for every $1,000 of inherited
wealth, the inheritor gives only $0.76. In other words, those who cre-
ate wealth give six times as much as those who inherit it. This sug-
gests that untaxed transfer of wealth to heirs may not result in as
much additional giving by heirs as the pure supply-side argument
might indicate. Furthermore, given the unlimited deduction for char-
itable gifts in the current estate tax, wealth creators can already give
as much as they want tax-free.
For Schervish and Havens’s supply-side theory to hold up empir-
ically, at least one of three circumstances must be true. First, the
wealth effect (the impact of owning more wealth) must exceed
the price (tax) effect (the after-tax cost or price of a donation or
bequest)—at least for high-net-worth individuals as they plan their
final estates. Although the wealth effect may not have been properly
specified (defined and tested) in earlier research, none of the empir-
ical research heretofore demonstrates a wealth effect that exceeds a
price effect.
Second, the wealthy must have a fairly fixed (inelastic) demand
for giving to their heirs. That is, for the repeal of the estate tax to
increase charitable giving, wealthy households must decide in
advance to give a relatively fixed amount or (fixed share) of their
estate to their heirs and the remainder to charity. Parents might
find convergence in their concern for their children and their desire
for their children to become philanthropic by creating a family
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foundation with a participatory role for the children in managing it.
Some preliminary results by Rob McClelland (personal correspon-
dence, June 2001) suggest that the share of final estates (widows
only) going to heirs is inelastic across estates of all sizes. Those above
and below $20 million gave an average of $0.85 of every additional
dollar of wealth to their heirs; those with an estate in excess of
$50 million behaved similarly ($0.86).
Research by McGarry (2001) suggests that parents are more likely
to make lifetime gifts and that those gifts are more likely to be much
larger as the income and wealth of the parents increases, but that the
type of wealth also affects the outcome. For example, holding the size
of wealth constant, wealthy holdings in a family farm or business
decreases the probability of a transfer, but if they make a transfer dur-
ing life, it is twice as large. It should be noted that life expectancy also
plays a role in parents’ decision to transfer gifts during life. McGarry
speculates that repeal of the estate tax will have a deleterious impact
on charitable bequests, because decedents can give to their heirs at
the same after-tax cost as they can now give to a charity.
The third way that the repeal of the estate tax might create a net
increase in philanthropy via supply-side impulses is if the heirs use
the bequest to create net new wealth by creating a new business or
making further investments in the family business, and then give
away some of that new wealth in excess of what their parents
planned to give. Earlier research by Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen
(1994a, 1994b) shows that inheritance may help ameliorate the prob-
lems that plague small business: liquidity and imperfect capital
markets. That is, an inheritance may serve as a tool for heirs to over-
come the typical problems of inadequate credit and cash flow in a
new business. Holtz-Eakin and colleagues found that large inheri-
tances are associated with a higher probability of starting a new busi-
ness and of that business surviving. Of course, any cost-benefit
analysis of charitable gifts and bequests from the heirs would need
to discount them to present values. Future charitable bequests that
are years away would have to be of much greater dollar value in
the future to be of equivalent value today.
Arguments for Continuing the Estate Tax
One reason cited for keeping an estate tax is to avoid excessive
concentration of wealth in relatively few hands. Others feel that by
limiting the accumulation of wealth and therefore the often-related
accumulation of political power, the estate tax limits skewing of the
political process. Research by Aaron and Munnell (1992) found that
the United States has a highly concentrated distribution of wealth—
in fact, arguably the most concentrated of the industrialized Western
nations—and that it became even more concentrated during the
1980s. For example, in this country, the top 1 percent of wealth hold-
ers own 32 percent of the wealth, compared to 16 percent of wealth
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in Sweden, 19 percent in France, and 20 percent in Canada. Only in
the United Kingdom do the wealthiest control as large a proportion
of the wealth. Similarly, the top 5 percent of wealth holders in the
United States control 55 percent of the wealth, which is between 10
and 20 percentage points more than the other European countries,
except the UK.
Gale and Slemrod (2000) point out that estate tax revenues equal
only about 0.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and about
0.1 percent of household net worth, implying that the current estate
tax is likely to have little meaningful impact on the distribution of
wealth. Conversely, these figures could also justify keeping the estate
tax and increasing its impact by either raising the tax rates or reduc-
ing the exemption, if one wanted to increase redistribution.
Furthermore, the estate tax does increase the total tax burden on
the wealthy, which increases the progressive nature of the overall tax
structure (Poterba, 1997; Joulfaian, 1998). In addition, the wealthy
do not act to minimize their estate taxes by way of legal transfers
(gifts) to heirs while they are alive (Poterba, 1997, 1998). In fact,
almost two-thirds of elderly wealth holders, who are likely to be con-
fronted with an estate tax liability, are not making transfers (gifts)
during life (Poterba, 1998). However, the wealthy are responsive to
changes in tax rate and differentials between personal income tax rate
and that of estate taxes ( Joulfaian, 1998; Poterba, 1998). This tax
rate sensitivity manifests itself in the timing of gifts during life and
bequests ( Joulfaian, 2000b). The wealthy seem to have a preference
for holding wealth and its concomitant benefits that exceeds the goal
to minimize taxes (Poterba, 1997; Joulfaian, 1999; McGarry, 2001).
Joulfaian (1999) concludes that “in addition to its contribution to
the nonprofit sector, charitable bequests may shed light on the sav-
ings motives of the wealthy; these transfers are perhaps inconsistent
with the view that the bequest motive explains the size of the wealth
amassed by the very wealthy. This gives more credence to the view
that the wealthy derive utility from holding wealth during life”
(p. 18). This suggests that the estate tax is unlikely to deter wealth
holders from accumulating wealth during their lifetime.
For nearly one hundred years, our national social policy
(through the estate tax) has had the result, intentional or not, of
helping to redistribute wealth. Alternatively, the estate tax may be
viewed as a mechanism to fund the government by those who bene-
fit much from national defense (as well as other governmental expen-
diture, such as infrastructure expenses for roads, bridges, and so on).
However, many wealthy households pay little in income taxes, as
much of their income is in the form of accrued capital gains that
could escape taxation until death ( Joulfaian, personal correspon-
dence, Jan. 17, 2001). Repeal may represent a major sea change in
the way our society determines how a portion of wealth is given to
public benefit at death—through taxes or through philanthropic giv-
ing. Regardless of one’s views on how this should be accomplished,
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a decision of this magnitude should have thorough public discourse
and full understanding of the consequences.
As with so many aspects of the estate tax debate, the evidence is
conflicting. The estate tax does not seem to be especially effective in
avoiding concentration of wealth or in taxing previously untaxed
income, such as unrealized capital gains. Ninety-eight percent of all
wealth holders pay no estate taxes, and those who do so pay rela-
tively little, thanks to generous exemptions. Of the remaining top
2 percent of wealth holders, most pay an average of only about 6 per-
cent of the estate’s value in estate taxes.
These factors suggest that relatively little wealth is redistributed
by government through collection of estate taxes. On the other hand,
one of the reasons many wealth holders pay so little in estate taxes
may be that they are not required to do so because they are already
giving so much to philanthropy. In this case, it may be possible that
although little wealth is being redistributed by the government, it is
being redistributed through giving to charitable causes as a result of
the existence of the estate tax and the incentive to give to charity to
avoid paying the tax.
Another reason offered for continuing the tax is that it sends a
signal to the American people that our society values individual phil-
anthropy so highly that it offers the taxpayer a choice between giving
his or her wealth to charity or giving it to the government (Mark
Wilhelm, personal correspondence, Sept. 20, 2001). The deduction
for philanthropy institutionalizes a national preference for the pri-
vate sector, including the nonprofit sector, to do certain things the
government might otherwise have to do. In other words, by encour-
aging individuals to support philanthropic activity, the estate tax
helps to avoid government spending on some activities the American
people value. Clotfelter and Salamon (1982) have applied similar
reasoning to the deduction for charitable donations in the personal
income tax.
The Price of Giving
One commonly cited reason for having an estate tax is that the exis-
tence of a tax on the wealth a person holds increases the incentive to
give to charity. The idea is that potential givers respond to changes
in the price of giving. The current top marginal tax rate of 55 percent
on estates means that it only “costs” the estate $0.45 to give $1.00
for philanthropic purposes. If the estate does not give the money to
charity, the heirs receive only the after-tax amount, or $0.45 for every
dollar of wealth, whereas the charity receives the entire dollar. This
argues that eliminating the estate tax reduces charitable giving, since
there are no savings or advantage in giving to charity rather than to
heirs.
Studies by the Treasury Department’s Joulfaian suggest that elim-
inating the estate tax would have lowered charitable bequests by
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12 percent, or $1.3 billion, in 1998. In another study done in 2000,
Joulfaian found that, without the estate tax, charitable bequest giv-
ing would decline between 0 percent and 31 percent, depending on
the model used to create the estimates. Former President Clinton,
as part of his justification for vetoing the repeal in 2000, estimated
that charitable gifts (both lifetime contributions and charitable
bequests) would decrease by $5–6 billion. A study commissioned by
INDEPENDENT SECTOR argued that elimination of the estate tax
would have reduced charitable bequests by $3 billion in 1996.
Pamela Greene and Robert McClelland (2001) use data from the
Health and Retirement Study for 1991 to replicate Joulfaian’s work.
This data set allows them to calculate an individual’s life expectancy
subjectively and to control for behaviors that might predict giving,
such as volunteerism and religious participation, which cannot be
done when using tax data. They find strong evidence that the estate
tax does increase annual charitable contributions. In addition, they
found that the tobit models (estimations of the probability of an inde-
pendent variable affecting the dependent variable) violated some
of the conditions required for such estimates. They used symmetri-
cally trimmed least squares to adjust for the problems in the error
term that the tobit results produced and found a smaller but still
significant price effect from the estate tax, but they also found a much
larger wealth effect than they did when using tobit. These differences
may have arisen from specification errors in the tobit analyses, or
from the fact that this sample looked at a “younger” population (fifty-
to-sixty-year-olds). Most important from the perspective of the estate
tax was the finding that the price effects of the income tax and the
estate tax were larger than the income and wealth effects for giving
during life. This suggests that repeal of the estate tax would have an
adverse impact on giving—at least lifetime giving. These results were
stable among several scenarios as to the growth rate of a household’s
assets.
Greene and McClelland found several other interesting results.
Religious participation was associated with significantly larger con-
tributions, as was volunteering. They also found that minorities gave
significantly less than whites overall, but when the race variable was
disaggregated into those who participate in some religious organiza-
tion and those who do not, they found that minority religious
participants gave more than whites (both religious participants and
nonparticipants). Minority nonparticipants gave so little that the
overall effect for minorities was negative. This bifurcation of giving
among minority members was further confirmed when a regression
including only religious participants found minorities to give signif-
icantly more than whites.
Bernheim’s results (1987) suggest that the estate tax is an inef-
ficient method for generating tax revenues; however, it has a
large impact on charitable giving. Overall, he estimates that charita-
ble bequests would have declined by almost 80 percent absent the
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estate tax and that such gifts would disappear almost entirely for
estates under $1 million. In 1983, this would have reduced charitable
bequests by an estimated $2 billion.
Joel Slemrod and Wojciech Kopczuk (2000) found that the
impact of the estate tax is more closely tied to the tax rate in effect
when the wealth holder is forty-five years old than to the tax rate at
the time of death. This suggests that individuals plan for the estate
tax and incorporate the anticipated estate tax rate into their fiscal and
estate planning. Similarly, James Poterba finds that transfers (gifts)
during life are less than would be expected by models of “dynastic
utility maximization,” that is, effecting the greatest satisfaction across
generations within a family, but that transfers (lifetime gifts) increase
with net worth, “possibly reflecting the impact of progressive estate
taxes” (1998, Abstract).
The price-of-giving theory is also supported by several studies
examining the impact of income taxes and donations. For example,
Daniel Feenberg (1987) found that income taxes are an important
determinant of charitable giving, almost regardless of how models
predicting giving are structured. Using a panel data set (following the
same people over several years), Charles Clotfelter (1980) found
that the impact of the price of giving was similar in the panel to
cross-sectional (single-year) estimates and that the tax price of giv-
ing plays an important role in explaining giving. However, William
Randolph (1995) demonstrates that people adjust their giving more
completely to changes in permanent (recurring) income than they
do to transitory (nonrecurring) income. Clotfelter (1985) also found
that the more expensive taxes become, the more income people give
to charity. This was especially true for people with high incomes.
The Role of the Financial Advisor
Research by the Philanthropic Initiative (2000b) also suggests that
the estate tax is important in prompting the wealthy to give. Work-
ing with the Council of Michigan Foundations, the Philanthropic
Initiative (TPI) interviewed 150 financial advisors in Michigan in
1996 and, additionally, surveyed 500 advisors. Many estate planners
say minimizing the estate tax is the only way they can persuade
clients to consider philanthropy. Even with the tax, many are reluc-
tant to raise the topic for fear of driving away the client. Without
it, there would be no fiscal incentive to mention philanthropy, so the
advisor would be even more hesitant to discuss a charitable bequest.
Of those surveyed, TPI found that almost 90 percent of estate
planners were willing to mention philanthropy occasionally and
54 percent were willing to mention it with all of their high-net-
worth clients. In the in-depth interviews, more than half of the advi-
sors did not feel comfortable raising the issues surrounding
philanthropy with their clients. TPI estimates that even with the
current estate tax, only 5–10 percent of the senior advisors could be
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termed an “initiator” with respect to philanthropic advising. Absent
tax motivations, many felt that it would be inappropriate to even
raise the issue. From this research, one might reasonably conclude
that without current leveraging of the estate tax, philanthropic
advising by financial planners would virtually disappear.
Anecdotally, this concern is felt among many professional
fundraisers. In a Chronicle of Philanthropy article last year, Billiterri
quotes Charles Collier, who is a senior fundraiser at Harvard, as say-
ing, “I can’t tell you the number of donors to Harvard and elsewhere
I know who say that, if the estate tax gets repealed, ‘I’m leaving much
more to my kids and much less to charity’” ( July 27, 2000).
However, not all observers perceive that the role of the finan-
cial planner with respect to philanthropic giving is based on the
existence of the estate tax. In a recent survey with more than fifteen
hundred respondents who were representative of the American pop-
ulation, the National Committee on Planned Giving found that legal
and financial advisors play a larger role in such planning than they
did eight years earlier (in 1992, when a similar survey was
conducted). Part of this may be due to increased affluence and bet-
ter financial acumen, but the committee concludes that “the desire
to support charity remains the primary motivation for most donors,
while tax and other financial considerations continue to be
secondary” (see the Survey of Donors 2000 at their Website,
www.ncpg.org). In addition, 28 percent of those surveyed who have
a charitable bequest in their will (and 68 percent of those with a
charitable remainder trust) cited a financial or legal advisor as
the source for the idea. Furthermore, as one anonymous referee
pointed out, financial planners would still remain interested in
charitable estate planning even with repeal of the estate tax, as there
are tremendous fees to be earned in drafting and managing chari-
table trusts. On the other hand, 35 percent of those making a
charitable bequest and 77 percent of those with a charitable remain-
der trust cited the “desire to reduce taxes” as an important factor
in their decision to make a gift (National Committee on Planned
Giving, 2001).
Taxes Are Not the Only Reason for Giving
Although there is strong evidence to support the idea that tax incen-
tives have some influence on giving, the complexity of the estate tax
issue is demonstrated by other evidence suggesting that tax incen-
tives are not the main motivation for making charitable contri-
butions. Top wealth holders are responsive to the effects of the
income tax, but Joulfaian (2000c) reports that for a stratified random
sample of wealthy tax filers over a decade, the average actual contri-
bution is about twice as large as the average deduction claimed. In
fact, in one year during the decade under study, Joulfaian found that
the average actual contribution exceeded the allowable deduction
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claimed by a factor of six. This suggests that the wealthy are willing
to donate in excess of allowable tax advantages.
Still, even with the estate tax incentive, “only 20 percent of the
wealthiest Americans leave anything to charity in their testamentary
decisions,” according to Philanthropic Initiative (2000b). This could
indicate that repeal of the estate tax incentive might not have as great
an effect on philanthropic giving as some fear.
The Need for Further Research
Although there has been much work done in this area, there is a need
for further refinement and replication of more of Joulfaian’s work
with additional samples to include longer panels and nonwealthy, as
well as wealthy, households. We need to further disentangle how
much of giving during life is prompted by a desire to minimize the
impending estate tax in comparison to a desire to minimize current
taxes, as well as to meet pure philanthropic desires. Similarly, further
investigation is needed to determine the extent to which bequests are
due to the price of giving versus the desire to give back to society ver-
sus the desire to avoid spoiling one’s heirs. Conversely, how much
does the estate tax affect the intent and behavior of individuals
regarding accumulation of wealth over their lifetime? These ques-
tions are further complicated by possible differences in the desire to
protect the standard of living of one’s spouse following one’s death
versus the standard of living of one’s children.
The Schervish and Havens finding (forthcoming) demonstrating
that there is a jump in giving (both during life and at death) corre-
lated with a jump in income and wealth suggests that future research
should test whether income and wealth effects are nonlinear (that is,
changing in ways that cannot be captured accurately by a straight
line); however, Greene and McClelland’s research (2001) suggests
that testing for the nonlinearity of wealth and finding its proper spec-
ification is rather complex. Their results suggest that more needs to be
done using advanced econometric techniques and other data sets.
Most of the empirical work on how much the estate tax affects
giving during one’s life is based on giving during the last year of one’s
life. Arguably, the last year of life is quite anomalous. Joulfaian’s work
(2000a) differentiates itself from this literature by including a panel
that allows examination of giving during the last several years of life
and at death. He includes approximations for the income tax effects
during life and for wealth holdings, such as wealth in the form of
business assets, which might affect giving during life because of liq-
uidity constraints. Joulfaian found that lifetime giving was ten times
larger than bequest giving when using the panel for several years of
income and donations, as opposed to using data only about giving
during the year prior to death. However, as Joulfaian points out,
using several years of giving during life as one variable is subject to
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aggregation bias. This panel does not track individuals over a
protracted period of time, so changes in the income tax code, the
estate tax, and marital status throughout one’s life may affect giving
during life and planning for giving at death in ways that are not
captured accurately in an end-of-life study. This panel includes only
the behavior of the rich, so another study is needed to address the
same effects on the nonrich.
Given the progressive nature of both income and estate taxes, the
tax price effect is likely to be endogenous (since the marginal income
and estate tax rates increase as income and estate increase in value, it
is difficult to separate out the causal relationships), so additional
research to replicate Joulfaian’s efforts is necessary to determine
whether his results hold up with various samples. Similarly, Joulfaian
found different coefficients (and levels of significance) when esti-
mating the tax price effect and the wealth effect for the estates of
married and single individuals. As one might expect, marrieds are
less responsive to tax price than singles, but singles are much more
likely to give as their estate grows than are married decedents.
Joulfaian found that singles bequeath more than married people, but
married households give more during life than single people do.
The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University is collaborat-
ing with the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID) to add a philanthropy module that tracks giving
and volunteering by households over time. This module will
enable researchers to model donative behaviors over the course of
life (and to make some assumptions at death), which should enable
scholars to address several of these issues. However, additional work
is still necessary to focus on high-income and high-wealth house-
holds, as they have not been oversampled in the PSID population.
This is particularly important given that most of the extant research
suggests a disproportionately high share of both lifetime and
bequest giving comes from high-income and high-wealth holders (for
example, Joulfaian, 2000c; Schervish and Havens, forthcoming;
Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish, 2001).
If further research finds that married households continue to
give more during life but to give less in bequests, but bequests
among final estates (singles, widows, divorced) are more respon-
sive to changes in wealth than to the tax-price effect, then repeal of
the estate tax may have a deleterious short-term impact on chari-
table bequests, but a positive long-term effect. This suggests that
from a dynamic perspective households would take care of the
needs of their heirs first but share some of their newfound “after-
tax” wealth with charities. Conversely, if additional studies find that
a bequest from a final estate is not responsive to a change in wealth
but is responsive to a change in estate taxes, then repeal of the
estate tax will have a detrimental effect on giving in both the short
and long run.
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Conclusion
A good deal of information is already available to inform the estate
tax debate, but more is needed. Human behavior is complex, and
ultimately it is impossible to know how much giving is based on tax
avoidance, how much is based on philanthropic impulses, and how
much is based on a combination of the two—or those two coalesced
with other factors. Many of the estimates given here are extrapola-
tions on the basis of how giving changed in the past when marginal
tax rates increased or decreased. There may be no way to know
whether the loss to philanthropy will be the same if the estate tax is
removed altogether, or whether repeal will result in a significant
increase in giving. It does seem likely that the sources and distribu-
tion of the new total philanthropy will change. Unfortunately, it is
impossible to predict precisely what the actual effect of eliminating
the estate tax will be, but additional studies may help improve under-
standing of the issue.
The reasons for and against continuing or repealing the estate tax
are complex, both theoretically and empirically. We believe these
complexities call for thorough study and more exhaustive public
discussion of the challenges and benefits of the tax; the potential
unintended consequences of keeping, changing, or repealing it; and
especially the impact on charitable giving. In the meantime, policy
leaders should use this time for phased-in reduction in rates
and increases in exemption for more study and debate of the issues.
Major policy changes involving these complicated questions
should not be addressed with a hasty or simplistic response. Nonethe-
less, the consistent evidence that the estate tax does increase giving
to nonprofits—at least in the short run—suggests that this effect must
be weighed in any cost-benefit analysis of these issues.
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